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Abstract: With continuous advancements in forensic science, expert testimony has 
become more common in criminal proceedings. This study (N = 170) sought to ex-
amine the combined influence of mock juror gender, expert gender, and testimony 
complexity in a case involving DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence. Findings re-
vealed that testimony complexity interacted with expert gender to influence verdict 
judgments. Participants were unaffected by testimony complexity when the expert 
was a man, but were more likely to convict when complex testimony was presented 
by a woman. In support of the heuristic-systematic model, expert gender elicited 
an effect only in high-complexity conditions—interestingly, this was exclusively the 
case for male mock jurors. Understanding how jurors cognitively process legal and 
extra-legal information may help legal actors (e.g. evidence experts, lawyers) com-
municate evidence and its legal relevance more effectively.
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1. Introduction
Scientific forensic evidence has transformed legal proceedings within the criminal courtroom. DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence has been referred to as “the single greatest advance in the search for 
the truth” and is considered to have the power to both exonerate the innocent and condemn the 
guilty (People v. Wesley, 1994). DNA is a long molecular chain containing an individual’s unique genetic 
code, which can be collected from blood, saliva, and other bodily substances (see Miller Albertson, 
2009). While DNA evidence is often complex and may not be easily understood by laypersons, its pres-
ence in a case can nonetheless influence mock jurors’ decision-making (Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & 
Krauss, 2008). Mock jurors tend to convict more often, and view the victim as more believable, when 
the Prosecution presents DNA evidence (Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali, & Sanchez, 2000).
Despite the persuasive effect of DNA evidence, a host of researchers have demonstrated that ex-
tra-legal variables (e.g. witness and juror characteristics) can also nonetheless interfere with juror 
decision-making (for a comprehensive meta-analytic review, see Devine & Caughlin, 2014). In par-
ticular, researchers have implicated gender as a relevant variable in understanding the effectiveness 
of expert testimony (McKimmie, Newton, Terry, & Schuller, 2004; Schuller, Terry, & McKimmie, 2001, 
2005). Such extra-legal variables are especially relevant when the presented evidence and legal in-
formation are contradictory or confusing to jurors (Kovera, McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999). Ivković and 
Hans (2003) have demonstrated that both testimony complexity and characteristics of experts (e.g. 
personality) affect how credible jurors perceive the experts to be, and consequently their evaluation 
of the evidence. The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of testimony complexity in 
criminal cases featuring DNA evidence, and whether expert and juror gender affected decision-mak-
ing. Understanding how jurors process information may help legal actors (e.g. evidence experts, 
lawyers) communicate evidence and its legal relevance more effectively. Moreover, insight into how 
jurors form their verdicts in criminal trials can aid in the development of strategies to reduce juror 
bias and facilitate a fair trial.
1.1. DNA evidence
Physical forensic evidence is, for the most part, reliable and valid (Lieberman et al., 2008). However, 
Lieberman et al. (2008, p. 31) cautioned that DNA might serve as the “gold standard” of forensic evi-
dence, but it is by no means the infallible, “platinum” standard. Saks and Koehler (2005) reported 
that among 86 instances of wrongful conviction—in which DNA evidence later exonerated the de-
fendant—forensic testing errors were responsible in 63% of those cases, and 27% were owing to 
faulty forensic science testimony. Hence, while DNA evidence has been a powerful source of exoner-
ating the wrongfully accused, virtually any form of physical forensic evidence can be misinterpreted 
in legal trials due to scientific and human testing errors (Lieberman et al., 2008; Saks & Koehler, 
2005). Unfortunately, DNA evidence can be so powerful as to influence juror decisions even when it 
is not presented. Lieberman et al. (2008) showed that participants sometimes misused blood type 
evidence (in which the defendant’s blood type matched that found at the crime scene) and errone-
ously reported that DNA evidence had been presented. Legal practitioners have recently become 
concerned about the so-called “CSI Effect”, whereby jurors will have unreasonable expectations 
about sophisticated forensic science, producing fewer convictions (Roane, 2005; Tyler, 2006). While 
findings on the CSI effect have thus far been mixed (Podlas, 2006; Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; Shelton, 
Kim, & Barak, 2006), there remains an air of perceived superiority surrounding DNA evidence 
(Lieberman et al., 2008).
Flawed collection and interpretations of DNA evidence are even more concerning because despite 
the potential for error, jurors indeed tend to consider it a foolproof indicator of guilt or innocence. For 
instance, Lieberman et al. (2008) found that participants rated DNA evidence as 95% accurate, 94% 
persuasive as an indicator of guilt, and overall more accurate than fingerprint or hair fiber evidence. 
These attitudes extended to verdict decisions, both in terms of acquittal and conviction when evi-
dence was exonerating or incriminating, respectively. Lieberman et al. (2008) also investigated the 
impact of cross-examination pointing out the limitations of DNA evidence. Although there was no 
main effect of cross-examination on verdicts, it was successful in alerting jurors to potential errors 
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in some instances. Specifically, they manipulated the cross-examination technique, such that either 
the expert’s credibility was challenged, or the evidence itself was questioned regarding potential 
contamination and other such shortcomings. Additionally, half of the trials featured a lab that was 
described as being more reliable than the other (e.g. not affiliated vs. directly affiliated with the po-
lice department). In trials featuring evidence-focused cross-examination, jurors convicted more of-
ten when the lab was described as reliable than when it had questionable reliability. For the unreliable 
lab, the evidence focused cross-examination decreased perceived accuracy of the DNA evidence. 
Therefore, it seems that expert testimony has the potential to remedy juror misconceptions of DNA 
evidence when jurors are provided with accurate and specific information about the process, rather 
than expert characteristics. However, this does not preclude the possibility that extra-legal varia-
bles, such as features of the expert, can interfere with such benefits.
Legal experts and the judicial system tend to assume that jurors are willing and able to systemati-
cally process trial information (Manaster, 2013). While jurors may possess the motivation to arrive at 
a fair verdict, they may not comprehend the content of intricate expert testimonies. Instead, jurors 
sometimes rely on pre-existing biases, beliefs, and expectations external to the legal content. 
Researchers have shown that jurors likely use one of two cognitive routes to process information: 
systematic processing of information and heuristic processing of information (Chaiken, 1980; Levett 
& Kovera, 2009). Systematic processing involves the methodical and analytical consideration of all 
information relevant to forming an opinion. Conversely, heuristic processing involves considering a 
more limited amount of information, using less cognitive effort and using mental “short cuts” to 
form opinions (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). The use of one form of cognitive processing vs. the 
other is largely dependent on the individual’s comprehension of the information they are using; 
people tend to rely on heuristic processing when they do not understand information (Chaiken, 
1980). To the aim of ensuring maximal comprehension of evidence quality, it is necessary to under-
stand what circumstances can foster effective expert testimony.
1.2. Expert testimony
In light of recent developments in forensic technologies and research, forensic specialists (e.g. toxi-
cologists, behavioral scientists) have become prevalent expert witnesses in court. An expert witness 
is any professional who has specialized knowledge, training, and experience in a particular field 
(Graham, 2011). Expert witnesses are often asked to present, explain, and interpret complex evi-
dence such as DNA to the court with language that can be understood by non-experts (Graham, 
2011). These witnesses can be called by either the prosecution of defense, and may present direct 
testimony, as well as be subject to cross-examination by the opposing attorney. This testimony can 
be presented at any point during the prosecution or defense’s case. Importantly, expert testimony 
must meet the Daubert standard, which specifies that “(1) the experts’ specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact [jury] to understand the evidence, (2) the testimony is based on sufficient fact 
or data, (3) the testimony is based on reliable principles and methods, (4) the expert has reliably ap-
plied the principles and methods to the facts of the case” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., 1993). The criteria include considerations of falsifiability, peer review and publication, known or 
potential rate of error and existence and maintenance of standards, and general acceptance of the 
theories intended for presentation (Solomon & Hackett, 1996). The Daubert standard also requires 
that the trial judge ensure that the evidence and expert testimony meet the aforementioned tenets 
during juror selection (Solomon & Hackett, 1996). Expert witnesses thus hold the vital role of explain-
ing complex evidence to jurors. However, evidence complexity and the manner of explanation have 
implications for how jurors process the information and ultimately reach a verdict (Cooper, Bennett, 
& Sukel, 1996; Lieberman et al., 2008).
1.2.1. Testimony complexity
Studies assessing jurors’ abilities to evaluate evidence have found that jurors’ capacity to process 
complex evidence is often limited (Cecil, Hans, & Wiggins, 1991). Cooper et al. (1996) evaluated the 
impact of complex expert testimony in the domain of biochemistry on juror decision-making and 
found that jurors were more likely to rely on cues beyond the content of the evidence when 
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assessing complex testimony. Specifically, when the expert testimony was easily understood, the 
researchers found no differences in verdicts as a function of expert credentials (e.g. degree from a 
prestigious vs. obscure institution). However, when the expert testimony was complex, mock jurors 
relied on expert credentials as the basis for their judgments. Mock jurors were more likely to side 
with the plaintiff when the expert with high credentials presented the complex testimony, compared 
to the expert with modest credentials. Cooper and Neuhaus (2000) found that testimony complexity 
about polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and its proximal or causational relation to cancer (i.e., high-
complexity testimony that contained technical jargon vs. low-complexity testimony that contained 
a greater proportion of lay terms rather than scientific terms) limited jurors’ ability to centrally pro-
cess information, leading jurors to be more affected by heuristic cues. When presented with complex 
testimony, mock jurors were more likely to discount the expert witness with strong credentials and 
high pay as a result of perceiving him as a “hired gun”, diminishing his effectiveness as a witness. 
Mock jurors were unaffected by source characteristics in the low complexity conditions. These find-
ings suggest that under cognitively challenging conditions, jurors are likely to shift from systematic 
to heuristic processing wherein juror biases are likely to have their greatest effect. Hence, research 
shows that not only do content-related factors (e.g. quality of the evidence; Kovera et al., 1999) in-
fluence jurors’ receptivity of expert testimony, but so can source-related factors (e.g. appearance of 
the witness; Memon & Shuman, 1998).
1.2.2. Expert gender
There is evidence that expert gender is one source characteristic that jurors use to evaluate expert 
credibility when processing evidence peripherally (Schuller & Cripps, 1998). Research investigating 
the heuristic role of gender bias in jury trials has found support for gender-domain congruence, in 
which experts who are men are regarded as more persuasive in male-dominated domains (e.g. 
 construction industry) and experts who are women are perceived as more qualified in female-dom-
inated domains (e.g. clothing industry; Schuller et al., 2001). McKimmie et al. (2004) demonstrated 
that when an expert testified in a domain consistent case (e.g. automobile business for men, cos-
metic business for women), the expert was seen more favorably and therefore had a greater influ-
ence on mock jurors’ final judgments. Applied to scientific testimony, these findings suggest that 
gender role stereotypes may differentially affect the impact of scientific expert testimony on trial 
outcomes. Researchers have shown that despite female candidates being preferred 2:1 over simi-
larly qualified male candidates, women are significantly underrepresented in science and math fo-
cused careers (Williams & Ceci, 2015; Young, Rudman, Buettner, & McLean, 2013). As Ceci, Ginther, 
Kahn, and Williams (2014) have noted, society appears to hold different expectations about career 
appropriateness on the basis of gender. Guimond and Roussel (2001) found that men are perceived 
as better in science and math than women, whereas women are viewed as better in social sciences 
and language than men. Additionally, research shows that the widespread cultural belief that men 
are more talented and interested in sciences (i.e., gender-science stereotype) is also a genetically 
heritable implicit attitude. Specifically, Cai, Luo, Shi, Liu, and Yang (2016) have tested twins’ implicit 
and explicit gender-science stereotypes and demonstrated that shared genetic (as well as non-
shared environmental factors) predict both implicit and explicit gender-science attitudes. Given the 
scientific nature of DNA evidence, forensic sciences may be more likely to be viewed as stereotypi-
cally-male, and therefore gender-domain congruent for male experts.
It seems that both the gender of the expert and the manner in which the expert witness explains 
the forensic evidence can have significant implications on how well jurors understand the evidence, 
which might in turn affect their verdict. Drawing on Cooper et al. (1996) findings, Schuller et al. 
(2005) sought to examine the influence of expert gender and testimony complexity in a civil trial 
involving a construction-related violation. As expected, gender impacted on mock jurors’ receptivity 
of the testimony, but only when the evidentiary information was complex. Specifically, when expert 
testimony was complex, higher damages were awarded to the plaintiff when the expert was male 
rather than female. These findings are consistent with those of Schuller et al. (2001), who demon-
strated expert gender to be a marker of source credibility when there was gender-domain congru-
ence. Interestingly, mock jurors tended to favor the female expert in the low complexity condition, 
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implying expert gender influenced decision-making differently depending on jurors’ ability to pro-
cess evidentiary information. Schuller et al. (2005) posit that gender role stereotypes about the ex-
perts’ language and presentation style may have impacted mock jurors’ evaluations. The more 
technical language employed by the woman expert in the complex condition may have been per-
ceived as incongruent with the characteristics typically expected of a witness who is a woman. 
Consistent with this notion, McKimmie, Newton, Schuller, and Terry (2012) found that mock jurors 
regarded complex testimony to have a masculine orientation, whereas simple testimony was seen 
as being more feminine in orientation. Not surprisingly, expert testimony was demonstrated to be 
most influential when an expert used gender-congruent language, primarily when the expert was 
female. That is, the female expert was seen as less persuasive when the testimony was presented in 
a complex, rather than simplified manner. These findings demonstrate that gender stereotypes may 
extend beyond an expert’s domain of expertise and operate differentially based on jurors’ abilities to 
evaluate the content of a message.
1.2.3. Juror gender
Gender biases affecting jurors’ perceptions of expert witnesses are not limited to gender role stereo-
types. Studies assessing gender differences in decision-making have demonstrated that male and 
female jurors process evidentiary information differently (Pozzulo, Dempsey, Maeder, & Allen, 2010). 
Findings from Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (1991) suggest that while women in the role of mock 
jurors tend to engage in an effortful and itemized analysis of the evidence, men tend to acquire in-
formation heuristically by considering the case as a whole. Assessing the influence of gender on ju-
rors’ evaluations of expert witnesses, Schuller and Cripps (1998) found that clinical expert testimony 
pertaining to a battered women’s case had more of an impact on men relative to women. For men, 
exposure to a woman’s expert testimony produced higher believability and lower responsibility rat-
ings for the defendant. In contrast, while women perceived the female expert more favorably, these 
impressions had little effect on jurors’ decisions. These findings are consistent with the literature on 
gender-domain congruence and may indicate that jurors perceive women to be better informed 
than men regarding these kinds of cases (Schuller et al., 2001). These findings also suggest that men 
may place more weight on expert testimony than women. However, more recent findings suggest 
that these results may be limited to expert psychological testimony. Research investigating the in-
fluence of juror gender in cases with physical evidence has demonstrated no gender differences in 
juror decision-making (McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller et al., 2001, 2005).
1.3. Current study
The present study was designed to examine the influence of gender and testimony complexity on 
juror judgments in a case involving DNA evidence. Specifically, we sought to understand whether 
expert gender operated as a heuristic cue when testimony regarding DNA evidence was complex, 
and whether juror gender had any influence in the decision-making process. The study employed a 
2 (juror gender: man, woman) × 2 (expert gender: man, woman) × 2 (testimony complexity: low, 
high) design, creating eight conditions. Drawing from the literature on models of persuasion (e.g. 
Chaiken, 1980; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991) several hypotheses were developed.
1.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Main effect
Given the gender effects that Schuller et al. (2005) reported, we expected a main effect of expert 
gender, such that the male expert would be viewed more positively than the female expert as a result 
of satisfying the gender domain congruence for forensic science (McKimmie et al., 2004). Given the 
null effects found in the juror gender literature and case domain, we did not anticipate any effects of 
mock juror gender (Baskin & Sommers, 2010; McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller et al., 2001, 2005).
1.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Interaction effect
We expected that testimony complexity and expert gender would interact to affect mock jurors’ 
perceptions of the expert and their verdict decisions. Based on the findings of Cooper et al. (1996), 
we anticipated that when expert testimony was complex, mock jurors would rely more on heuristic 
cues (such as gender) in evaluating the expert, such that the male expert would be viewed more 
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positively and would yield more guilty verdicts. In contrast, we did not expect expert gender to affect 
mock jurors’ evaluations in the low complexity condition, as jurors were expected to be better able 
to use systematic processing.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Data were collected from two jury-eligible samples (i.e., Canadian/American citizens, over the age of 
18 with no prior indictable/felony convictions) for a total of 170 participants (17 participants who 
failed one or more manipulation checks were excluded from the sample; see below). Sixty-three 
participants were undergraduate students recruited from a Canadian university. Student partici-
pants (men = 30.2%, women = 69.8%) had a mean age of 20.4 (SD = 4.4). Forty-five percent of the 
student sample self-identified as Caucasian, 23.8% as Black, 12.7% as Middle Eastern, 7.9% as Asian, 
1.6% as Aboriginal-Canadian and 9% identified as another race. One hundred and seven partici-
pants were community members recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The commu-
nity sample (men = 43%, women = 57%) had a mean age of 36.3 (SD = 13.6). This sample was 
predominantly Caucasian (78.3%), with 8.7% self-identifying as Black, 7.5% as Asian, 4.7% as 
Hispanic and .8% as another race. Participants in the student sample received course credit for their 
participation, while the community sample received up to $2.00 based on successful completion of 
attention checks embedded within the study. Six students and 11 community members were 
dropped from analyses for failing to correctly answer the question “What was the gender of the 
expert witness in the trial?”.
2.2. Materials and procedure
2.2.1. Trial transcript
Participants’ responses were collected through the online survey tool Qualtrics. Participants had an 
average completion time of 22 min. Jury-eligible participants read through one of four descriptive 
accounts of a second-degree murder case, adapted from Lieberman et al. (2008). The case scenario 
provided a general overview of the criminal incident, such that that the victim was stabbed in the 
park while on a jog. It also featured the testimony/cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert 
witness (a University of California graduate that had been overseeing the DNA Identification Unit at 
CellCode for the past 7 years) and defense’s eyewitness (a custodian for the city of Los Angeles 
working in Colonial Park at the time of the attack). In each scenario, the gender of the expert witness 
(man, woman) and complexity (low, high) of the testimony varied in the case description.
Testimony complexity was manipulated by using more technical language in the high complexity 
version (e.g. “Short tandem repeats are short alleles, making them less prone to being affected by 
degradation, and have slower rates of mutation so that the fragments are more stable in the ge-
nome”), and simplified language in the low complexity version (e.g. “Short tandem repeats are very 
small, so are less likely to be damaged or changed over one’s life”). A pilot study (N = 58) was 
 conducted to ensure there were significant differences between the perceived scientific intricacy 
(e.g. language complexity) of the expert’s testimony. Significant differences were found between 
participants’ comprehension of the low complexity testimony (M = 7.00, SD = 1.86) compared to the 
high complexity testimony (M = 5.23, SD = 2.74; F (1, 56) = 9.05, p < .001). In the final case scenario, 
the gender of the expert was manipulated using names (e.g. Frank Miller for the male expert, 
Francine Miller for the female expert), titles, and pronouns, as well as photographs that were pilot-
tested (N = 35) to match on perceived age (t(34) = 0.00, p = 1.00) and attractiveness (t(34) = .550, 
p = .82). In the final case scenario, one photo of the prosecution’s expert witness (man or woman) 
and one photo of the defense’s eyewitness (man) accompanied the testimony/cross-examinations. 
To help inform mock juror judgments, participants were also provided with the California Penal Code 
criteria for the charge, as well as instructions regarding the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.
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2.2.2. Juror questionnaire
Participants then completed a number of opinion related measures in the form of a juror question-
naire. The questionnaire included a dichotomous judgment of guilt (guilty/not guilty), as well as the 
extent to which the DNA evidence influenced their decision ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much). Participants indicated how compelling and credible they perceived the DNA evidence to be 
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).
To assess participants’ impression of the prosecution’s expert witness, participants rated the ex-
pert on competence (i.e., believability, honesty, trustworthiness, credibility, clarity, comprehensibili-
ty, helpfulness, professionalism, and influence) and character (i.e., likeability, attractiveness, 
persuasiveness) on 9-point rating scales from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Subjective questions 
regarding the expert’s level of education and experience conducting DNA analyses were assessed 
separately on scales from 1 (minimally educated/experienced) to 9 (very educated/experienced).
Given the various domains within these measures, we assessed the dimensionality of the items so 
as to combine questions that substantially overlapped. We conducted a principal components anal-
ysis with a direct oblimin rotation, first using the default Kaiser criterion of eigenvalues greater than 
one (i.e., revealing components that account for more variance than any single item). This criterion 
resulted in a three-component structure. However, components were only retained if at least three 
items showed loadings of .32 or greater, as this value represents roughly 10% of overlap in variance 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Examining the component loadings demonstrated that only two items—
those pertaining to expert experience and expert education—loaded onto the second component, 
and so they were dropped. Therefore, results were supportive of a two-component structure, which 
accounted for a cumulative 66.5% of the variance. The first component contained items pertaining 
to expert competence (i.e., believability, honesty, trustworthiness, credibility, clarity, comprehensi-
bility, helpfulness, professionalism, and influence). The second component was comprised of items 
about the expert’s character (i.e., likeability, attractiveness, persuasiveness).
The expert competence component, which contains 9 items, demonstrated strong internal con-
sistency (α = .95), with strong item-total correlations (>.60), and Cronbach’s α would decrease with 
deletion of any item. Similarly, the expert character component, which contained three items, 
showed strong internal consistency, α = .82, strong item total correlations (>.60), and a decrease in 
Cronbach’s α with any item deletion. Based on these results, we decided to analyze the components 
of expert competence and expert character separately. In order not to lose the information from the 
education and experience measures, we analyzed these items as individual variables.
3. Results
3.1. Verdict
Overall, our results revealed a fairly even verdict split, with 47% (n = 80) voting not guilty, and 53% 
(n = 90) voting guilty. To determine whether students and community members would differ in their 
verdict decisions, we conducted a Chi-Square analysis. This test revealed no significant relationship 
between sample type and verdict, χ2 (1, N = 170) = 1.35, p = .25, v = .09. As such, we collapsed across 
sample type for the remaining verdict analyses.
In order to determine whether juror gender, expert witness gender, and testimony complexity 
would influence verdict decisions alone or in combination, we conducted a 2 (juror gender: man, 
woman) × 2 (expert witness gender: man, woman) × 2 (testimony complexity: low, high) × 2 (verdict: 
guilty, not guilty) hierarchical log-linear analysis. See Table 1 for a breakdown of participant gender 
in each condition.
This analysis revealed a non-significant expert gender x testimony complexity x verdict interac-
tion, χ2 (1, N = 170) = 2.96, p = .08. However, follow-up analyses revealed that when testimony com-
plexity was high, a significant effect of gender emerged, χ2 (1, N = 80) = 5.21, p = .02, v = .26, such 
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that participants were significantly more likely to vote guilty when the expert was a woman (69%) 
as compared to when he was a man (44%). In contrast, when testimony complexity was low, there 
was no effect of expert gender, χ2 (1, N = 90) = .05, p = 1.00, v = .02. See Table 2 for a summary of 
these results.
3.2. Perceptions of the DNA evidence
In general, participants rated the DNA evidence very highly—they found the evidence very compel-
ling (M = 7.21, SD = 1.61), indicated that it strongly influenced their verdict decisions (M = 7.13, 
SD = 1.71), and believed it to be very credible (M = 7.21, SD = 1.76). These perceptions did not vary as 
a function of sample type, (t values between −.02 and −1.63, all p’s > .10), and so further analyses 
were collapsed across this variable.
A correlation analysis revealed that our DNA evidence ratings (i.e., the degree to which partici-
pants felt that the evidence was compelling, influenced their verdict, and was credible) were associ-
ated (r’s ranging from .71 to .81; all p’s < .001), and so we conducted a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) using our DNA evidence rating variables as the dependent measures, and juror 
gender (man, woman), expert gender (man, woman), and testimony complexity (low, high) as the 
independent variables. This analysis revealed no significant multivariate effects, and only one sig-
nificant univariate effect—a main effect for expert witness gender on the degree to which partici-
pants felt that the DNA evidence influenced their verdicts, F(1, 168) = 4.73, p = .03, η2 = .03. 
Participants who saw testimony from a female expert witness (M = 7.41, SD = 1.53) indicated that 
the DNA evidence influenced their verdicts more than those who saw testimony from a male expert 
witness (M = 6.88, SD = 1.82).
3.3. Perceptions of the expert witness
In general, participants rated the expert witness quite highly (means ranged from 6.46 to 8.01). 
None of these perceptions varied as a function of sample type (t values ranging from .24 to 1.37, all 
p’s > .10), and so we collapsed across sample type for further analyses of these variables.
3.3.1. Expert competence
We observed a significant juror gender x expert gender interaction on this subscale, F(1, 168) = 7.86, 
p = .006, η2 = .05. Follow-up analyses revealed that for male jurors, there was a significant effect of 
expert witness gender, t(63) = −2.94, p = .005, such that the male expert (M = 6.69, SD = 1.55) was 
Table 1. Breakdown of participant gender in each condition
Condition Juror gender
Man (%) Woman (%) Total (%)
Low complexity Male 12.3 (n = 21) 15.3 (n = 26) 27.6 (n = 47)
Female 9.4 (n = 16) 15.9 (n = 27) 25.3 (n = 43)
High complexity Male 7.6 (n = 13) 16.5 (n = 28) 24.1 (n = 41)
Female 8.8 (n = 15) 14.1 (n = 24) 22.9 (n = 39)
Total 38.2 (n = 65) 61.76 (n = 105) 100 (n = 170)
Table 2. Effect of expert witness gender and testimony complexity on verdict
Expert gender Testimony complexity
Low (%) High (%)
Man Guilty 48.9 (n = 23) 43.9 (n = 18)
Not Guilty 51.1 (n = 24) 56.1 (n = 23)
Woman Guilty 51.2 (n = 22) 69.2 (n = 27)
Not Guilty 48.8 (n = 21) 30.8 (n = 12)
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seen as less competent than the female expert (M = 7.70, SD = 1.15). There was no effect of expert 
witness gender on female jurors, t(101) = .92, p = .36. See Figure 1 for a depiction of these results.
3.3.2. Expert character
For this component of expert perceptions, we observed a significant main effect of expert witness 
gender, F(1, 168) = 4.39, p = .04, η2 = .03. This was qualified by a significant three-way interaction 
among expert witness gender, juror gender, and testimony complexity, F(1, 168) = 4.83, p = .03, 
η2 = .03.
Follow-up tests demonstrated that when testimony complexity was low, there was a significant 
effect of juror gender on expert character perceptions, F(1, 89) = 5.61, p = .02, η2 = .06. Male partici-
pants (M = 5.55, SD = 1.56) provided lower ratings of the expert’s character than did female partici-
pants (M = 6.30, SD = 1.34).
When testimony complexity was high, a different pattern emerged—specifically, we observed a 
significant interaction between juror gender and expert gender, F(1, 79) = 5.32, p = .02, η2 = .07. 
Follow-up tests revealed that female jurors did not differ in character assessments of male (M = 6.14, 
SD = 1.26) and female (M = 5.74, SD = 1.89) expert witnesses, t(49) = .91, p = .37, in conditions of high 
complexity. However, male jurors provided higher ratings of character to the female (M = 6.56, 
SD = 1.23) expert as compared to her male counterpart (M = 5.14, SD = 6.56), t(26) = −2.03, p = .05.
3.3.3. Experience
For this measure, a three-way interaction among expert gender, juror gender, and testimony com-
plexity was observed, F(1, 167) = 8.05, p = .005, η2 = .05. Follow-up tests showed that when testi-
mony complexity was low, there were no significant effects of juror gender or expert gender. 
However, when testimony complexity was high, there was a significant expert gender x juror gender 
interaction, F(1, 79) = 4.40, p = .04, η2 = .06. Simple effects tests demonstrated that when a male 
expert testified with high complexity, there was no effect of juror gender on perceptions of his expe-
rience, t(39) = −.71, p = .48. However, when a female expert testified with high complexity, juror 
gender was significantly related to perceptions of her experience, t(36) = 2.03, p = .05, such that 
men (M = 8.53, SD = .64) rated her as more experienced than did women (M = 7.43, SD = 2.02).
Figure 1. Juror gender × expert 
witness gender interaction on 
expert competence rating.
*p < .05.
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3.3.4. Education
We observed a significant juror gender x testimony complexity interaction on participants’ percep-
tions of the expert’s education, F(1, 168) = 3.87, p = .05, η2 = .02. This was qualified by a three-way 
interaction among expert gender, juror gender, and testimony complexity, F(1, 168) = 8.50, p = .004, 
η2 = .05. Follow-up tests showed that when testimony complexity was low, no significant effects of 
expert witness or juror gender were observed. However, when testimony complexity was high, we 
observed a significant expert gender x juror gender interaction, F(1, 79) = 6.28, p = .01, η2 = .08. 
Simple effects tests demonstrated that for male jurors, there was a significant main effect of expert 
gender, t(26) = −2.12, p = .04, such that they perceived the female expert (M = 8.27, SD = .88) as 
more educated than the male expert (M = 7.46, SD = 1.13). There was no significant effect of expert 
witness gender on female jurors.
4. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of testimony complexity on juror decision-
making in a case involving DNA evidence, and whether expert or juror gender influenced use of that 
testimony. Participants read a description of a second-degree murder case, adapted from Lieberman 
et al. (2008), which featured testimony/cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert witness. In 
line with previous research demonstrating the persuasiveness of DNA evidence, participants in this 
study generally rated it as credible, compelling, and influential in their verdict decisions. Notably, 
those who read testimony from a female expert rated the evidence as more influential in their even-
tual verdict. This finding deviates from earlier work on gender-domain congruency (McKimmie et al., 
2004; Schuller et al., 2001), which posits that male experts would be more effective in this tradition-
ally-male field (science). Given that our experts were pilot-tested to match on age and attractive-
ness, it appears that mock jurors in this study were simply more persuaded by a female expert. This 
suggests that forensic science/DNA analysis may not be perceived as a stereotypically-male domain, 
or that gender-domain congruency was not supported in this particular study.
We compared the student and community samples on each of our dependent measures, and 
found there to be no significant differences between them. As such, the use of a student sample in 
this domain may be an appropriate proxy.
We expected a testimony complexity by expert gender interaction effect on perceptions of the 
expert as well as on verdict decisions. In line with findings from Cooper et al. (1996), we hypothe-
sized that when expert testimony was complex, mock jurors would rely more on heuristic cues (such 
as gender) in evaluating the expert. In contrast, we did not expect expert gender to affect mock ju-
rors’ evaluations in the low complexity condition. Following findings that Schuller et al. (2005) re-
ported, we also predicted a main effect of expert gender, such that the male expert would be viewed 
more positively than the female expert (McKimmie et al., 2004). The data did not fully support these 
hypotheses. We found that when testimony complexity was low, there was no effect of expert gen-
der, but when testimony complexity was high, participants were significantly more likely to vote 
guilty when the expert was a woman as compared to when he was a man. This runs contrary to 
earlier work in the area, which demonstrated that male experts were more effective when testimony 
complexity was high, and female experts were more effective when testimony complexity was low 
(Schuller et al., 2005). Given the paucity of work in this area, it is difficult to say whether these differ-
ences reflect different domains of testimony, the contrast between civil and criminal trials, or some 
other phenomenon. Future work will be needed in order to properly tease apart the complex rela-
tionship between gender and language in this context.
Results, however, did suggest that complex testimony might invite gender biases. We examined 
the impact of gender and complexity on perceptions of the expert, in terms of perceived compe-
tence, character, experience, and education. In conditions with high complexity, we observed a 
number of interesting gender effects—in particular, male jurors rated the female expert witness 
more favorably than her male counterpart with regard to competence, character, and education, 
whereas female jurors did not exhibit expert witness gender effects. With regard to perceived 
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experience, under conditions of high complexity the male expert was perceived largely the same by 
both genders, whereas male jurors rated the female expert more favorably than did female jurors. 
These findings demonstrate a number of heuristic influences under conditions of high complexity, as 
suggested by earlier research on the heuristic-systematic processing model (Chaiken, 1980).
The male jurors’ preference for the female expert in terms of character, education, experience, 
and competence deserves further attention. These results are contrary to our expectations, and to 
previous literature linking science to male stereotypes (Nosek et al., 2009) and gender-domain con-
gruency (McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller et al., 2001). They may reflect social desirability concerns 
of our male participants, or they may reflect the shifting of stereotypes based on a growing number 
of women in science or media portrayals of such (Cavender & Deutsch, 2007; Deutsch & Cavender, 
2008). For example, Cavender and Deutsch (2007, p. 72) analyzed the content of several episodes of 
Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) and reported that “CSI’s female characters have essentially the 
same duties and abilities as their male counterparts,” but also that the female forensic investigators 
may have “special women’s insights”. These depictions of competent (although still stereotypically 
female) women in the forensic science context may be improving perceptions of female experts in 
this area. Other research has shown that perceptions of various evidence types are influenced by 
crime television, although verdicts are not directly affected (e.g. Maeder & Corbett, 2015; Schweitzer 
& Saks, 2007). However, it must be noted that content analyses of crime-television shows demon-
strate that they are far from reflective of reality (Ley, Jankowski, & Brewer, 2012). Aside from 
 television, it may be the case that our participants (many of whom were university students) are 
accustomed to seeing or even working with women scientists and thus do not hold explicit (i.e., 
 deliberate) gender-stereotypic views of science and women (see Miller, Eagly, & Linn, 2014). Miller 
et al. (2014) suggest that gender-science stereotypes are culturally variable and therefore have po-
tential to change. Additional research should investigate whether exposure to female forensic scien-
tists through personal relationships or media portrayals is related to perceptions of expert testimony, 
and whether women in other scientific domains (e.g. chemistry or physics) are regarded as favora-
bly. Given the notable number of female forensic experts on television, perhaps there is less gender 
incongruence than predicted from the base rates of women in the science professions. For now, 
these findings shed light on a possible shift in men’s perceptions of women in science, at least in the 
courtroom.
4.1. Limitations
This study featured some notable limitations. First, all juror simulation research has some limitations 
to ecological validity. In particular, this study used a written trial scenario rather than a video or live 
trial, and it also did not feature a deliberation component. However, researchers have examined the 
influence of trial medium on juror decision-making, and have shown that written descriptions yield 
comparable results compared with more realistic presentations (Bornstein, 1999; Pezdek, Avila-
Mora, & Sperry, 2010). Further, individual juror judgments are widely recognized as an important 
deciding factor in final verdict outcome (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Additionally, we did examine juror 
decision-making in both community and student samples—for which we did not observe any differ-
ences—bolstering the generalizability of our findings. Sears (1986) has argued that students’ deci-
sion-making can differ from that of community members, and Bray and Kerr (1982) have cautioned 
that students do not often serve as jurors.
Perhaps more significantly, some of our findings fell short of traditional cutoff values, and so re-
sults should be interpreted with caution. Also of note is that participants may have been wary of 
expressing stereotype congruent or sexist views about the female expert witness. However, most of 
these effects occurred in the low complexity conditions, for which previous studies suggest that 
gender differences might not be expected, due to the stronger availability of systematic 
processing.
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Another notable limitation is the imbalance of male and female participants in each condition 
(see Table 1). Although this imbalance existed in both high- and low-complexity conditions, it could 
partially explain why we were unable to uncover 2- or 3-way interactions with participant gender.
Finally, these data came from an online sample, which limited our control over participants’ study 
environments. The use of manipulation checks helps to filter out participants who did not attend 
closely to the trial stimulus. Further, several studies support the conclusion that Mechanical Turk 
tends to yield reliable data (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Gardner, 
Brown, & Boice, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipierotis, 2010).
5. Conclusion
In general, this study demonstrated a number of interesting gender effects in the context of a mur-
der trial involving the presentation of DNA evidence. As posited by the heuristic-systematic model, 
these effects were found largely in conditions involving highly complex testimony, suggesting that 
gender may play a significant role in the courtroom when jurors are less able to comprehend the 
information that is presented to them. This has a number of implications for the delivery of expert 
testimony in this domain, and for jury selection as well, since (unexpectedly) male jurors rated the 
female expert more favorably than her male counterpart. Future research should continue to inves-
tigate perceptions of experts as a function of gender and testimony complexity, in order to deter-
mine whether these effects are applicable beyond the context of DNA evidence. Given the prominent 
role that DNA testimony now plays in our court system, these findings shed light on the potential 
roles of gender and language in criminal trials.
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